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The “Thucydides Trap,” according to Graham Allison’s recent Destined for War (2017), 
describes the moment “when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power” (p. xvi). 
Following so-called realist readings before him, Allison locates the origins of 
international conflict in a two-step structural process first described by Thucydides: the 
rise of Athens and the fear inspired in Sparta which made war inevitable. This logic of 
conflict supposedly meant that Athens and Sparta were “destined for war” – and 
illuminates a frequent destiny for states in similar circumstances. 
 S.N. Jaffe’s Thucydides on the Outbreak of War provides an important corrective 
to this common, indeed practically hegemonic, reception of Thucydides. The reading of 
Thucydides as an archetypal realist, Jaffe argues, misses how the causes of the war do not 
lie solely in an external structural necessity but also in complex psychological and 
cultural responses unique to Sparta and Athens. Although Thucydides does maintain a 
general view of the necessity behind the conflict, on Jaffe’s reading this necessity unfolds 
from the particular view of the good held by each party to war. Athens and Sparta are not 
destined for war; they choose war for complicated reasons and compulsions distinctive to 
each of them. 
 Jaffe builds this argument through a close reading of just the first (of eight) books 
of Thucydides’ History. The “commentarial form” of his analysis traces the text as 
Thucydides presents it, only occasionally reaching beyond these chapters as it moves 
from beginning to end of the book. Following the approaches of Leo Strauss and Clifford 
Orwin, among others, Jaffe excludes nearly all considerations of the social and political 
context of the Histories, instead offering an “internal reading” that focuses on the 
“underlying authorial intention” and thematic purposes evident in the text itself (p. 8).  
 Although the book follows the order of Thucydides’ text, Jaffe organizes his 
broader argument into five general claims. First, Jaffe suggests that Thucydides is 
interested in human nature and not just the nature of international systems, as realists 
have long maintained. Key episodes in the History reveal concentrated attention on 
characteristic behaviors to which states are prone. The initial quarrel between the 
Athenians and the Spartans provoked by the desperate situation of Potidaea does not just 
illuminate their particular qualities, but rather how and the degree to which regime type 
shape responses. Thucydides directs his readers’ attention to differences in character even 
as he promises to elucidate a more general pattern of interstate conflict. 
 Thucydides’ interest in human nature, moreover, does not lead him to efface the 
particularity of different state actions. Jaffe’s second general claim complicates his first 
by insisting that Thucydides’ account of human nature is “largely psychological” (p. 9). 
Thucydides illuminates how particular psychological “dispositions, attitudes, or beliefs” 
meet particular moments (p. 9). In other words, the meaning of Thucydides’ 
generalizations depends entirely on the circumstances of its unfolding. Thucydides’ 
treatment of such moments also allows his readers to evaluate from a distance: while a 
character in the History may advance an argument for a strategic purpose, Thucydides’ 
framing of these as examples of broader phenomena within human nature opens possible 
questions. When the Spartans, Corinthians, and Athenian envoys discuss the Potidaea 
situation, Jaffe shows how Thucydides’ treatment places the specific arguments of the 
speeches in a broader context of fear, honor, and profit. Each regime prioritizes these 
forces in a different way according to their dispositions; yet at a higher level of 
generality, these passions explain why actors go to war despite strong arguments to the 
contrary.  
 Thucydides’ political psychology, Jaffe maintains with his third general claim, 
appears as a catalogue of success and failure. By juxtaposing actors’ speeches and 
descriptions of events, on the one hand, with his own accounts of “what really 
happened,” Thucydides presents an implicit view of how and why actors went wrong. 
The Corinthian envoys, for example, describe how the Athenians align their speech and 
deeds whereas the Spartans distrust their own judgments. Yet placed in the broader 
context of characteristic overestimation of their capacities by the Athenians and 
underestimation by the Spartans, Thucydides, on Jaffe’s reading, furnishes “the formal 
requirements of successful political action” (p. 70), illuminating how misperception leads 
to error and thus the degree to which prudence depends on a clear-eyed assessment of the 
political lay of the land. 
 Within the structure of the History itself, however, the “national characteristics” 
of Athens and Sparta prove decisive for the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. This 
assertion forms Jaffe’s fourth general claim, which he qualifies by underscoring how 
each of their particular dispositions stems from a common human nature. Thucydides 
presents this “programatically” (p. 11) according to Jaffe, putting on display the political 
passions and how these manifest themselves in different regimes. In the Archaeology, for 
instance, the differences among the development of Athens and Sparta appear as products 
of disparate cultivations of a common nature: “Partly in response to their original 
geographic circumstances, particularly the quality of the soil, Athens and Sparta 
developed distinctive historical trajectories, which in turn contributed to the tropoi [sc. 
ways or essences] of the cities” (p. 156). Athens and Sparta become themselves through a 
complex interplay of material factors and political responses to these factors. Thucydides 
thus sees structure developing through serial responses similar to what Sartre called 
practico-inert reality. 
 The differences among Sparta and Athens inform Jaffe’s fifth general claim: that 
the internal logic of Book I adumbrates how the outbreak of the war stemmed in part 
from Sparta and Athens’ particular perceptions of the triggering events themselves, 
perceptions which generate “a different but no less compelling necessity for war” (p. 12). 
The History thus reveals a “dynamic combination of character and strategic 
circumstance” (p. 192) that complicates structural explanations with second image ones. 
Necessity is “characterological” (p. 197), meaning necessity emerges when attitudes 
specific to actors and their psychology confront events. The “inevitability” to which 
Allison and his realist forebears refer is a perception among other perceptions, both 
shaped by the particular regime that identifies it,  as well as remaining capable of 
miraculous transformation. 
 What Allison takes as objective inevitability – the destiny for war – Thucydides, 
on Jaffe’s reading, shows as partly a product of the subjective views of the actors 
themselves. Although he does not comment directly on it, Jaffe’s interpretation points to 
an important aspect of a much-discussed passage in the History: Book I, section 23, line 
6. What Allison refers to as the “most frequently cited one liner” he glosses as “It was the 
rise of Athens and the fear that this constituted in Sparta that made war inevitable” (p. 
vii). But Thucydides’ text does not contain quite the causal structure that Allison (who 
relies on the Robert Strassler edition of Richard Crawley’s translation) imputes. 
Thucydides’ Greek separates the Athenians’ “growing power” from “inspiring fear.” It’s 
both their power and Sparta’s reaction to them that explain the outbreak of the war. 
Jaffe’s interpretation highlights a disjuncture already within Thucydides’ text between the 
material transformation of one party and the perception of another. How did the 
Athenians come to inspire such fear? And what about the Spartans positioned them to 
become this fear’s object? Jaffe’s careful study offers the beginning of a response; yet a 
fuller response would require attention to the remainder of the History, a task which Jaffe 
does not take up. Attention to the rest of Thucydides’ classic thus awaits further inquiry. 
